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Pipeline Politics and Energy (In)security in 
Central and South-Eastern Europe 
General Survey 
Pipeline Politics and Energy (In)security 
Dr Eamonn Butler 
Introduction 
This essay concerns energy security, or more specifically energy insecurity, in Central and South-Eastern 
Europe. Insecurity can be defined as a situation in which vulnerability from a particular danger or threat is 
perceived to exist. Threats generally come from external sources, but can also come from within, and 
usually have an existential quality. Energy is existential in that it underpins modern life—we use it to 
provide power, heat and light to our homes, workplaces and cities; to fuel our cars and other forms of 
transport; to help produce and power technology; and even to help us grow and process the food we eat. 
Energy is a critical resource and as such it is a commodity of significant strategic importance, particularly 
with regard to access. The main concern that has driven the rise of energy insecurity has been ‘security of 
supply’. This refers to the ability of states and other users to guarantee sources of affordable energy, 
sufficient to meet their needs across all economic and business, societal and even politico-military 
activities. Energy insecurity exists when internal actions, those by third parties, or even natural disasters, 
threaten to, or actually do, disrupt the supply or affordability of energy. 
Energy insecurity is not unique to Central and South-Eastern Europe. The region shares many concerns 
with other parts of Europe and states across the globe. However, because of the historic legacies of the 
region’s communist past, some of the vulnerabilities and threats it faces are more pronounced. For 
example, the region is highly dependent on imports of fossil fuels such as petroleum and natural gas, with 
some states importing as much as 60%–100% of their needs from a single supplier, the Russian 
Federation. (Other than Romania, nearly all Central and South-Eastern European states are dependent on 
natural gas imports, with almost 100% of requirements imported by Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Lithuania, the former Yugoslav republic of Macedonia—FYRM, 
Moldova, Serbia, Slovakia and Slovenia.) Monopolization of the market by Russia, as the primary 
supplier, means that long-term bilateral export-import contracts tend to be less favourably priced, 
resulting in higher energy costs. The mix of energy types used by states in the region is considered to be 
less diverse than in Western Europe, meaning that any disruption to their primary energy type could be 
problematic. This is especially so when it is acknowledged that the region’s import infrastructure is 
dominated by static pipelines built during the Soviet era and that integration with Western European 
infrastructure is limited. Without suitable alternative energy access or adequate storage any problem with 
the pipelines, or with the source of gas (or oil) entering the pipeline system, can have serious 
consequences for import-dependent states. 
The importance of pipelines cannot be underestimated. They have provided the Central and South-Eastern 
European region with access to oil and gas for decades, and this has determined how the region obtains 
much of its energy needs. Until recently, the situation was more challenging for natural gas because the 
expense and lack of technical capability to liquefy and regasify natural gas meant that its transportation 
was only realistically capable via pipelines. Since, as a liquid, oil could be transported via tankers, oil 
pipelines were not as critical, although they remain by far the cheapest and quickest means to transport 
oil, and the most suitable for some of the region’s landlocked countries. As a result of these issues, 
 
 
Central and South-Eastern Europe is considered to be the most vulnerable region of Europe with regard to 
energy security. Even those countries with substantial domestic energy sources, such as Poland (coal and 
lignite), have become increasingly reliant on imports of low-carbon fuels like natural gas, as they seek to 
meet the strict climate change targets introduced by the European Union (EU) for the reduction of CO2 
emissions. Much of this natural gas has also been imported by pipelines. In order better to understand 
how pipeline politics plays a role in creating challenges and vulnerabilities for Central and South-Eastern 
Europe’s energy security, as well as informing policy solutions, we need to consider the region’s relations 
with its primary and potential energy suppliers, such as Russia, and with its partners in the wider EU. 
 
Energy and the EU 
In Europe, until recently, there has been a growing demand for energy. It is considered that energy 
consumption levels within the EU peaked around 2005 (when gross inland energy consumption reached 
1,824.7m. metric tons of oil equivalent, according to Eurostat figures, compared with 1,671.1m. tons in 
1995 and 1,627m. tons in 2015), and improved efficiency of energy use was predicted to result in further 
reductions in energy consumption. In comparison with the EU as a whole, energy consumption levels of 
the Central European countries peaked much earlier than those of their Western counterparts. However, 
by 2035 domestic production of primary fossil fuels was also predicted to decline: of oil, by 57%; of coal, 
by 49%; and of natural gas, by 46%. As a result, it is assumed that energy imports will remain constant to 
cover around 55% of consumption, while natural gas imports will increase by around 49%. This means 
that the EU is likely to remain the world’s largest net importer of natural gas. It is important to note, 
however, that the levels of imports are not balanced across all the EU member states, and some countries 
import much more than those others that have domestic resources available.  
In 2016, the EU imported 54% of all the energy it consumed. This figure has steadily increased since 
2000 when the dependency rate on energy imports was 47%.  Crude oil makes up the bulk of imported 
energy equating to some 69% in 2017, while combined liquefied and gaseous natural gas made up 22.7%, 
with solid fuels (coal, lignite, coke, peat) equating to 6.3%. The majority of these imports come from a 
small group of countries—the Russian Federation, Norway, Algeria and Qatar. Because of the nature of 
the EU’s infrastructure and geographic proximity each of these supplier countries tends to direct their 
products to specific clusters of EU member states. As already mentioned, the countries of Central and 
South-Eastern Europe are predominantly supplied by Russia. When energy imports are concentrated 
among a few supplier states, there is an increased risk of vulnerability should external matters result in 
disruption to supply and sufficient alternative mechanisms to counter that disruption are not in place. For 
a number of the countries of Central and South-Eastern Europe this is exactly what happened in 2006, and 
again in 2009, when Russia suspended gas sales to Ukraine—one of the primary transit routes for Russian 
gas imports. These two Russia–Ukraine gas crises, and the fact that the majority of the countries of the 
region are now members of the EU, is often used to explain why the EU has become more involved in 
energy matters and why energy has increasingly become an area of integration activity at the EU level.  
Matters are a little more complex, however. Energy has always been important for the European 
integration project, from its foundation as the European Coal and Steel Community, through the 
establishment of, in turn, the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom), the Energy Charter Treaty, 
and the Energy Community, and an Energy Union, a Framework Strategy for which was adopted by the 
European Commission in February 2015. There have always been ebbs and flows in the intensity of 
policy development, but since the 1990s and early 2000s interest in energy has grown significantly at the 
EU level. Import dependency has not been the only factor behind this rapid expansion of energy interests. 
The promotion of market liberalization and growing concern for environmental matters and climate 
change have also been hugely important. This tripartite justification for the increased interest in energy 
 
 
can also be used to explain the EU’s securitization of energy. It is necessary to recognize that there has 
also been a fluctuating hierarchy of importance across these three drivers. 
In the early 2000s it was very much the last two factors (market liberalization and the climate agenda) that 
were most significant. Questions about supply did exist, but it is important to note that they tended to be 
framed in the context of market forces, and were about ensuring affordable supplies and improving the 
connectivity of market infrastructure to ensure regular supplies at reasonable prices amid growing 
demand. Diversification of suppliers was primarily about opening the market to competitive forces and 
preventing monopolistic pricing structures. This is not to say that questions over transit routes or 
reliability of suppliers were not a concern, rather that they were not the priority. Fears about unreliable 
suppliers ‘turning off the tap’ were not on the agenda, and Russia was more or less regarded as a safe and 
secure supply partner. 
Central and South-Eastern European countries fell in line with this general EU position and this was 
evident in the language they used at the time. Acutely aware of energy challenges primarily stemming 
from their time under communist regimes, and in advance of their accession to the EU, the Central 
European countries initiated co-operative efforts to support their integration into the wider EU energy 
market. For example, in 2002 the Visegrad Group (V4—comprising the Czech Republic, Hungary, 
Poland and Slovakia), under the presidency of Hungary, initiated the V4 Energy Working Group to 
support the economy ministries in the V4 countries in the improvement of co-operation across the energy 
sector. The main purpose was to improve information exchange in support of market liberalization across 
the region, speed up privatization strategies, and ensure the maintenance and expansion of storage 
facilities—all demands posed by the EU to the Central European candidate states. Improved 
interconnections with Western Europe were also recognized as necessary to support market integration.  
Diversification away from Russian supplies was not considered a rationale for this type of co-operation. 
When diversification was mentioned it was viewed as ‘in addition to’, rather than ‘instead of’, Russian 
supplies. It was about choice and price. As Hungarian Prime Minister Ferenc Gyurcsány stated, ‘Mad 
would be the country which was happy about depending on a single supplier for the purchase of a 
strategically important service and product’, thus demonstrating the fact that replacing Russia as a single 
supplier with an alternative would not resolve the fundamental challenges informing energy insecurity. 
This could be recognized when proposals were put forward in 2002 for a major new pipeline that was 
intended to open up the EU market to natural gas from the Caspian and Central Asia regions. The 
consortium behind this project, which became known as the Nabucco Pipeline, initially involved Austria 
and Turkey, and was soon joined by Hungary, Bulgaria and Romania, demonstrating the importance of 
these countries as transit states for the proposed pipeline and the opportunity for them to benefit from 
access to the piped gas. All three countries are highly dependent on Russia for their gas imports and have 
paid premium prices via take-or-pay contracts with Russia. The assumption was that having additional 
sources of gas imports would potentially give these countries increased leverage in any future gas contract 
negotiations. 
 
The Emergence of Pipeline politics: Nabucco versus South Stream 
Nabucco was developed in response to the discovery of the Shah Deniz (Şah Deniz) gasfield in the 
Azerbaijani sector of the Caspian Sea in 1999. Comprising some 330 sq miles, Shah Deniz is one of the 
largest oil- and gasfields to be discovered in recent years, and it began production in 2006. Nabucco was 
intended to provide transit of natural gas from this field to Europe and was at first considered a 
commercial venture, but it was not long before the project took on a political undertone, although for the 
Russian Federation it always held political connotations. 
 
 
The Nabucco project was potentially threatening for Russia because it challenged its effective monopoly 
on gas imports to Europe, specifically Central and South-Eastern Europe. It is not to Russia’s advantage if 
that region, as Russia’s largest customer, has alternative suppliers, thus providing an opportunity to 
bargain on price. For Europe this is exactly what Nabucco was intended to achieve: to increase 
competition and reduce prices. For the EU and its member states two occurrences served to alter their 
position towards Nabucco and shift it from being a predominantly commercial venture to a political one. 
The first of these was the first Russia–Ukraine gas crisis in 2006, in which disagreement over the price of 
gas to be paid by Ukraine resulted in the suspension of gas flows from Russia to Ukraine for four days. 
As Ukraine is the major transit route for gas destined for the EU markets, the disruption to levels of gas, 
exacerbated by Ukraine allegedly siphoning gas intended for EU countries, resulted in a significant 
decline in supplies. For some Central European countries this was a serious problem. It highlighted their 
failure to ensure adequate stored gas supplies and emphasized their over-reliance on Russia as single 
supplier. Furthermore, the trustworthiness of Russia as a supplier and Ukraine as a transit country, which 
had previously been accepted, was called into question. 
The second matter was the emergence of alternative competitor pipeline projects promoted by Russia. 
Initially, Russia had suggested an extension of its Blue Stream gas pipeline via Turkey as a way to 
provide an additional access point for Russian gas into Europe. It eventually decided against this, and in 
2007 it announced the South Stream project, which entailed the construction of a pipeline under the Black 
Sea, through Bulgaria and Serbia, and into Hungary, with the aim of supplying Europe with some 
63,000m. cu m of gas per year. For Russia, the purpose of South Stream was two-fold: it sought, first, to 
reinforce Russia’s dominant position as the primary gas supplier to Central and South-Eastern Europe, 
and second, to open up possible new opportunities by providing Russia with a southern access point to its 
European markets without the need to transit Ukraine. This would be a good fit with the parallel proposed 
Nord Stream pipeline under the Baltic Sea, which would directly link Russia to Germany, and provide 
some 55,000m. cu m of natural gas per year. By establishing both these projects, Russia was essentially 
claiming that it could remain a viable and reliable partner by providing new transit routes. In so doing, it 
effectively sought to accuse Ukraine of responsibility for problems with natural gas transit to the EU. 
South Stream also allowed Russia to present a project as a direct rival to Nabucco and to seek to prevent 
its monopoly on gas supplies from being eroded too quickly. Russia claimed that South Stream would be 
more competitive and less expensive to build. It also created uncertainty for possible investors because it 
raised questions about the sustainability of two competing pipelines. 
Russia failed to convince many in Europe that it could be trusted, and rhetoric that made reference to 
energy as a foreign policy tool, as well as some of the actions undertaken by Russia towards energy-
importing and transit states, fuelled the rise of a discourse in Western political, academic and media 
circles emphasizing ‘a new Cold War’, ‘energy wars’ and an ‘energy weapon’. Energy had become highly 
political. In the southern corridor space, the Nabucco and South Stream pipeline projects were suddenly 
framed as Europe versus Russia, thus emphasizing political tensions. Inevitably, it was less 
straightforward than this, because principal EU member and candidate states from Central and South-
Eastern Europe were partners in both projects, thus adding to the complexity of the situation. 
None the less, what became apparent in Europe during this time is a clear shift in the framing of energy as 
a security concern, with pipeline politics perceived as a crucial element in this development. A second 
Russia–Ukraine gas crisis in 2008–09 reinforced concerns about security of energy supplies for Europe 
and specifically for the Central and South-Eastern European countries. However, the ultimate success of 
this securitization of pipelines within the wider energy security discourse is questionable. 
Nabucco was prioritized as a high-level European project with a clear political and security rationale, and 
was supported by the EU and the USA. The reason it became so politicized was in part a result of the 
need to secure political backing and justification for funding support. This was coupled with its 
 
 
identification as a possible signature project by the European Commission, which was seeking to develop 
its energy policy competencies, both internally and externally. The Russian–Ukrainian gas crises, the 
urgency to diversify supplies, and growing concern about Russian use of energy and pipelines as foreign 
policy tools, allowed the project to be securitized as a means to introduce alternative suppliers, break the 
Russian monopoly and ultimately curtail Russia’s ability to use energy for political means. The 
securitization of the Nabucco pipeline project effectively prolonged its existence in a way that would not 
have happened were it to have been a standard commercial project. Despite this apparent wealth of 
political support, commercial viability remained fundamental, and no matter how much political backing 
the project received, if it proved financially unfeasible it would be unable to progress. This is exactly 
what happened, and Nabucco effectively stagnated as a project. Strangely, this outcome was widely 
predicted, yet there seemed to be a form of collective denial, and whenever any party, such as some of the 
more frustrated Central European countries, did suggest that the project was not likely to come to fruition, 
they were castigated and shamed as being ‘anti-European’, or insufficiently supportive of energy 
solidarity within the EU. 
 
Pipeline Politics: Economic versus Political Rationales 
The need for commercial viability resulted in further competitor pipeline projects emerging to challenge 
both Nabucco and South Stream. The most significant of these was the Azerbaijani- and Turkish-owned 
Trans-Anatolian Natural Gas Pipeline (TANAP), which was announced in 2011 and which would 
effectively replace the need for much of the Turkish section of the original Nabucco project. This forced 
the Nabucco consortium to re-evaluate their proposal. The rebranding of Nabucco as ‘Nabucco West’ 
reflected the truncation of the project as a spur pipeline from TANAP through Central and South-Eastern 
Europe. This revised project looked more achievable and even economically viable, but the ongoing 
economic crisis and the investment of the State Oil Company of the Azerbaijan Republic (SOCAR) in 
Greece, where it purchased 66% of the Greek Transmission Network Operator in 2013, may have had an 
influence on a 2013 decision by the SOCAR-led Shah Deniz consortium to award a contract for the transit 
of TANAP gas to the Trans Adriatic Pipeline (TAP), rather than to Nabucco West. TAP had initially been 
proposed as early as 2003 as a pipeline to be constructed through Greece and Albania to Italy, and 
following the award of the contract, the TANAP consortium purchased shares in TAP, reinforcing it as 
the official extension of TANAP in Europe. TAP had been placed in direct competition with Nabucco 
West, which was to run further to the north, as the primary route for the European section of the southern 
energy corridor. 
The political concerns of the countries of Central and South-Eastern Europe and the EU that drove the 
need for Nabucco were not shared by Azerbaijan and its Shah Deniz-TANAP partners; thus it was not 
surprising that a more modest project with a seemingly higher investment return was selected. This leads 
to questions concerning the relationship between commercial activity and political requirements. If 
something is so important that it warrants the type of prioritization that Nabucco received, then it has to 
be supported by relevant financial investment for political means. This did not happen for Nabucco, 
which was predicated by the need to adhere to market-led requirements. Political neutrality is required if 
the market is to operate as it should. Herein lies the paradox: that energy policy cannot be politically 
neutral. European countries know this, as does the EU, and when the market is allowed to take 
precedence, it will adversely affect the ability of national governments to ensure that large infrastructure 
projects of strategic (if not commercial) importance are fulfilled. This is one of the significant challenges 
for Europe and for the countries of Central and South-Eastern Europe that need improved infrastructure 
but are unable always to rely on the market providing it. How can the economics be balanced with the 
politics? 
 
 
 
 
The Problem of South Stream 
The failure of Nabucco West to win the Shah Deniz contract effectively meant that the project became 
untenable. As a consequence, in order for the southern gas corridor to reach Central and South-Eastern 
Europe the possible options were either a secondary spur from TAP, perhaps into Bulgaria, or Russia’s 
South Stream project.  
Although it was a Russian project, South Stream had the support of a number of the countries of Central 
and South-Eastern Europe, including Bulgaria, Croatia, Greece, Hungary, the FYRM and Serbia, as well 
as Italy and Austria. This demonstrates the fact that Russia remains an important strategic partner within 
the energy sector for these countries. Each of these countries had signed contracts with Russia to 
complete various primary and secondary parts of the pipeline along its European section. Despite the 
enthusiasm of the countries of the region for South Stream, the project encountered a number of 
challenges. These included accusations from the European Commission in December 2013 that the 
contracts signed between Russia and EU member states, and with Serbia (which, while a candidate 
country for EU membership, is a member of the Energy Community), were in violation of the EU’s Third 
Energy Package regulations concerning ownership of pipelines by natural gas extractors and the right for 
third party access to the pipeline. In June 2014 the project was effectively halted, owing to a European 
Commission infringement procedure against Bulgaria concerning non-compliance with EU procurement 
requirements. Bulgaria had also been threatened with possible sanctions by the USA, owing to the 
participation of Russian company Stroitransgaz in the consortium awarded the contract to build the 
Bulgarian section. At the same time, as for Nabucco previously, there were questions over the financial 
viability of the project. Competition from other energy projects and sectors (such as the increased 
adoption and affordability of liquefied natural gas—LNG) was creating a more challenging environment 
where long-term contracts and fixed pipelines become expensive and inflexible. Ongoing political 
tensions owing to conflict in eastern Ukraine, following the annexation of the Ukrainian peninsula of 
Crimea by Russia in March, and the ensuing imposition of Western sanctions on Russia in response, also 
had a negative impact on the project, and in December 2014 Russia announced that it was to abandon 
South Stream in favour of a new pipeline project to be developed in co-operation with Turkey.  
The new TurkStream pipeline was proposed within the framework of the Russian-Turkish 
Intergovernmental Commission on Trade and Economic Co-operation. However, following the shooting 
down of a Russian fighter jet by the Turkish military on the Turkey–Syria border in November 2015 and 
the subsequent imposition of Russian sanctions against Turkey, which included the suspension of the 
Intergovernmental Commission, TurkStream was also in effect suspended. It was not clear if there were 
other rationales for the rapid decision by Russia effectively to freeze this project, but it serves to highlight 
how geopolitics and energy supply can intersect. The TurkStream project was reinstated in October 2016, 
following improved political relations between Russia and Turkey. This revival coincided with a cooling 
of relations between Turkey and Europe and the USA owing to Turkey’s role in managing the Syrian 
refugee and migration crisis and the purges that followed the failed July 2016 coup against President 
Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. The construction of the two TurkStream pipelines began in May 2017, and the 
deepwater pipelay for Line 1 was completed in April 2018.  It is anticipated that the two Turkstream 
pipelines, which will cover more than 930km to deliver gas to both Turkey and to southern and south-
eastern Europe, will carry 31,500m. cu m of gas annually. For Russia, this will also enable it to maintain 
its objective of implementing ways to bypass Ukraine and other former Soviet republic transit states.    
 
 
 
Implications for Central and South-Eastern Europe 
The cancellation of the Nabucco and South Stream pipelines has had significant implications for Central 
and South-Eastern Europe within the context of the southern energy corridor. First, it highlights that their 
perceived energy needs, even when framed in strong security terms, are not strong enough to override 
financial realities. Economics takes precedence over politics. It also confirms that this part of Europe is 
likely to remain reliant on the Russian Federation, and that routes via Ukraine are likely to continue to be 
important for the foreseeable future unless possible new, land-based routes—such as the spurs from 
TAP—are developed, or defunct projects are reactivated, as has been the case with the TurkStream 
pipeline. It was confirmed in May 2018 that the second Turkstream pipeline will be directed towards 
Bulgaria, following negotiations between Bulgaria and Russia. It is hoped that some of the gas from 
Turkstream 2 will go to Bulgaria’s proposed gas hub project at the Black Sea port of Varna. The 
European Commission supports this hub as a common energy security project for the region. This 
highlights the fact that projects such as Turkstream will primarily be of benefit to the Central and South-
Eastern European region if they can connect to existing or new transit and storage infrastructure. This is 
the idea behind the proposed Eastring project, which will transport gas from Bulgaria to Slovakia via 
Romania and Hungary. This project is promoted by the countries involved and has also been designated a 
Project of Common Interest (PIC) under the guidelines for Trans-European energy infrastructure - Ten 
Year Network Development Plan. This guarantees the highest level of political support from the 
European Union for the project and its implementation. To support this the European Commission 
approved €1m. in financial support from the Connecting Europe Facility for a feasibility study, which is 
due to be completed by June 2018. 
When considered in terms of diversification of supply and access to new suppliers of gas, projects such as 
Turkstream are potentially problematic for the region because it reinforces continued reliance on Russian 
gas; however, it has also compelled the countries of Central and South-Eastern Europe carefully to 
consider new responses to their energy insecurity. 
The governments of the countries of Central and South-Eastern Europe have been astute, understanding 
that their energy security could never be entirely reliant on the southern corridor pipeline projects. Those 
projects, such as Nabucco or Southstream, if they had come to fruition, might have given some long-term 
stability of supply, but they would not have resolved the other major problems they face in terms of 
energy insecurity—specifically their integration into the wider EU energy infrastructure. A north–south 
corridor had been identified as a major missing link in this infrastructure, allowing connection of various 
energy systems (gas, oil and electricity grids) from the Adriatic in the south to the Baltic in the north. 
With the demise of the large project for a southern corridor (not taking TAP or Turkstream into account), 
this north–south corridor has become even more essential, and specific projects of common interest have 
been agreed at EU level. Many of these projects will be incorporated into the broader conceptualization of 
regional energy frameworks. For example, the concept of north–south has been extended to what the EU 
now terms ‘north–south–east’, in which the promotion of a series of smaller energy infrastructure projects 
would allow the development of a connection linking the Baltic, Adriatic and Black Seas. This would be 
achieved by investing in existing infrastructure and building reverse-flow interconnectors between 
countries across the region. The countries of Central Europe have been promoting this idea for some time, 
but until recently it has always taken second priority to the large pipeline projects. As it turns out, it may 
take a more significant and relevant role in supporting the development of energy security for the region. 
The fact that these interconnectors allow bi-directional flow should also provide for a sharing of gas 
resources in times of stress.  
Locating sources of financing for these small-scale projects has also been difficult, and the countries of 
Central and South-Eastern Europe have looked to the EU for financial support. The EU recognizes that 
there are occasions when such projects need financial support and has been more supportive of this type 
of project that it has of ‘grand pipeline projects’ such as Nabucco, because they can be delivered more 
 
 
quickly and cheaply. This has been part of the reasoning behind the Eastring project which will connect to 
the , and it has been claimed that the advantage of the pipeline lies in the fact that it is comparable to 
Nabucco or South Stream in terms of added value for the European energy sector, but deliverable at 
significantly lower cost. Capital expenditure is estimated at €2,000m. – €2,400m., which is considerably 
lower than the anticipated cost for Nabucco (up to €14b.) or for South Stream (up to €16b.).  
The need to ensure improved infrastructure is also important because it allows the region to benefit from 
LNG as an alternative to piped gas. The Baltic states (Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania) are a good example 
of a former ‘energy island’ region that has sought to use LNG as a means of obtaining gas from new 
suppliers. There have been problems in agreeing the location of LNG terminals in the Baltic region, 
emphasizing the fact that countries continue to perceive great benefit in being the host of energy facilities. 
A new LNG terminal has entered into operation in Poland, while on the Adriatic, another was planned in 
Croatia. Progress towards the construction of the Croatian terminal has been repeatedly delayed, with 
feasibility studies only being carried out in 2015, despite the proposals having been under consideration 
for several years. It was intended that the two terminals in Poland and Croatia would ultimately be 
connected, allowing the north–south corridor to be completed. It is likely that the Croatian terminal, 
which will be a floating facility, will not be operational until 2020 at the earliest, and will have a capacity 
of 2,600m. cu m of gas per year, which is lower in comparison with the original proposed landbased 
terminal. Like other small, regional projects it has benefited from EU funding, receiving €102m. from the 
EU’s Connecting Europe Facility. 
Another way that the countries of Central Europe have sought to improve their energy position has been 
through increased gas storage. Most of the countries in the region learned a harsh lesson from previous 
Russia–Ukrainian gas crises, and the concern about a possible reduction in supplies following the 
annexation of Crimea appeared to justify the efforts to increase storage for critical points of the year. All 
countries in the region successfully coped with a simulated stress test on their gas supplies undertaken by 
the European Commission in 2014. Suggestions stemming directly from that exercise, which concluded 
that improvements to regional infrastructure should be completed more rapidly, led to the establishment 
of the so-called Central East South Europe Gas Connectivity High Level Group (HLG), which first met in 
February 2015. The HLG comprises representatives from across the wider Central and South-Eastern 
European region, including nine EU member states—Austria, Bulgaria, Croatia, Greece, Hungary, Italy, 
Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia—and six contracting parties to the Energy Community—Albania, 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, the former Yugoslav republic of Macedonia, Moldova, Serbia and Ukraine. The 
aim of the group, which has met 4 times since its foundation, is to coordinate facilitation of cross-border 
and trans-European gas projects and there has as of 2017 been a move to extend the remit of the group 
beyond regional cooperation on gas.  
 
The Return of Pipeline Politics 
The southern energy corridor has without doubt been the scene of some of the more complicated pipeline 
projects with direct impact on the countries of Central and South-Eastern Europe. It is, however, not the 
only area of pipeline activity that bears upon the energy concerns of these countries. The Baltic Sea is the 
location of the Russian- and German-supported Nord Stream pipeline. Becoming operational in 2011, 
Nord Stream was from its inception in 2005 just as controversial as the pipelines planned in the south. 
Acting as an alternative transit route for Russian gas into Western Europe, Nord Stream would bypass 
traditional transit states, including Ukraine, Belarus, Poland, Slovakia and the Czech Republic. This 
raised considerable concern over the possible loss of transit fees should gas be diverted away from 
traditional routes. Other concerns that were raised included those focusing on the ecological environment 
of the Baltic Sea, security issues with respect to the use of the Russian Baltic Fleet for protection of the 
pipeline, and access to Polish ports. 
 
 
Unlike Russia’s South Stream pipeline, Nord Stream was completed on schedule and its dual pipelines 
now connect Russia directly with Germany, although it currently only operates at one-half of its capacity 
(27,500m. cu m), owing to the EU’s Third Energy Package third party access requirements, which restrict 
Gazprom’s access to the Ostsee-Pipeline-Anbindungsleitung (OPAL) pipeline that connects Nord Stream 
with the Czech Republic. Despite this, Russia, recognizing that this pipeline route has been its only 
successful pipeline project in recent years, identified the route as suitable for expansion and proposed a 
Nord Stream 2 pipeline project. Completion of the new project would increase operational capacity from 
55,000m. cu m to 110,000m. cu m, enabling Russia to fulfil its policy of transit avoidance and potentially 
to bypass Ukraine in most of its exports to the EU of natural gas. Both the tensions surrounding the 
continued conflict in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions of eastern Ukraine (which commenced in mid-
2014) and the January 2016 decision, by Ukraine’s state utility Naftogaz Ukrainy, to increase transit fees 
for Russian gas by 50%, have reinforced the potential benefits, if not need, of Nord Stream 2 for Russia. 
There may be economic or commercial rationales for Russia and its Western energy company partners 
(Uniper of Germany, Austrian-based OMV, Royal Dutch Shell—of the Netherlands and the United 
Kingdom, German producer Wintershall Holding GmbH and French utility company Engie) to promote 
Nord Stream 2, but many countries will doubtless also perceive political rationales. As the President of 
Lithuania, Dalia Grybauskaitė, expressed: ‘It is highly regrettable that our big partners (in Europe) are 
trying to explain to the EU member states that it [Nord Stream 2] is only a private commercial project. 
We all are very well aware that all energy projects of this scale are geopolitical, and their goals are 
precisely geopolitical.’ It was this position that was stated in a joint letter, sent in March 2016 by nine EU 
member states (Croatia, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia and 
Romania) to Jean-Claude Juncker, the President of the European Commission. They argued that the 
pipeline failed to reflect the EU’s intention, underpinned by the strategy set out for the Energy Union, to 
diversify energy sources, and therefore posed ‘risks for energy security in the region of Central and 
Eastern Europe, which is still highly dependent on a single source of energy’. This is something that the 
European Commission has since recognized, and Maroš Šefčovič, the Vice-President of the Commission 
responsible for the Energy Union, has explicitly stated that Nord Stream 2 would not help to diversify 
Europe’s energy sources.  Nord Stream 2 would reinforce European reliance on Russian energy sources 
and have economic implications for those countries that remained reliant on transit fees, specifically 
Ukraine. Although it has divided Europe, Nord Stream 2 continues to be considered to represent 
significant commercial value, and the Western-based firms backing the project have agreed to provide 
one-half of the financing, with the other one-half coming from Gazprom. Thus, Nord Stream 2 has not 
had to seek EU financing to be built. This suggests that the relative strength of countries and large 
corporations correlates with the success of pipeline projects. It highlights an important difference between 
the north and the south of Europe, with projects such as Nabucco or South Stream failing to be taken 
seriously because of the limited influence of the countries supporting them, while smaller projects often 
have to seek strategic EU financial support in order even to move beyond the feasibility stage. More 
importantly, the geopolitics underpinning projects like Nord Stream 2 helps to create a rather acrimonious 
situation, pitting the European Parliament, the European Commission and key member states of the EU, 
as well as Russia, against each other. 
The most recent discord has focused on Germany as the primary EU member state partner in the project. 
German domestic politics has come into play because although Chancellor Angela Merkel has on 
occasion expressed ‘political’ doubt about the project, she is also reliant upon the support of the 
opposition Social Democratic Party (SDP) for her government. There is a belief that the SDP is 
supportive of Russian business interests, so any move to halt the project might create a political crisis 
within an already shaky government. Furthermore, German business has expressed concern that if the 
pipeline is not built then Russia will divert its attention back to the southern European route, via an 
enhanced Turkstream or even renewed South Stream project. Thus, there could be significant financial 
business losses for the country and the west European energy companies that have already paid 
 
 
significant sums of money for the project.  This highlights the fact that there remains a potential north-
south divide when it comes to the business reality of energy pipeline politics. The private Nord Stream 2 
project gained German maritime approval to start construction in March 2018, with Finland providing 
approval in April 2018 and Sweden in June 2018. The first stage of the pipeline was laid in Germany in 
May 2018 and it is generally assumed that it is now too late to stop the project which is expected to be 
completed by the end of 2019.  Once completed and operational at full capacity the Nord Stream pipelines 
would place Germany at the centre of Russian gas imports to Europe, force a West-to-East direction in 
flow of gas to Central Europe and potentially even lead to higher prices for the region. It is for this reason 
that the regional projects, such as Eastring or the Croatian LNG terminal have taken on such important 
significance.   
 
Conclusion 
Amid the collapse of large-scale pipeline projects designed to address the energy insecurity of Central and 
South-Eastern Europe, smaller practical solutions have appeared to allow the region to respond more 
effectively and quickly. They are more easily financed and can draw upon significant EU financial aid 
projects, allowing them to be completed in a more manageable timeframe. As such, they perhaps suggest 
that the large pipeline projects are not always the best solution to energy insecurity and can actually 
increase insecurity for Central and South-Eastern Europe. This is certainly the case with regard to the 
Nord Stream 2 pipeline project, which highlights that for some countries, specifically energy providers 
such as Russia, pipelines still have value, but that they can come at a cost for others. 
Does this mean that the issue of pipeline politics and energy security has been overplayed in Europe? On 
the one hand, yes, perhaps it has. Enmeshed in a cycle of geopolitical power play, it is easy to 
overemphasize the security threat to Europe’s energy, but, in reality, Europe and the countries of Central 
and South-Eastern Europe have been able to respond and develop alternative solutions to the challenges 
confronting them. However, there is more to this story concerning the EU, its member states and its 
neighbours. Energy will remain one of the areas in which politics continues to be played out, and this has 
an adverse impact on the ability of the EU to present a united front. The South Stream project clearly 
demonstrated that EU member states do not necessarily agree with each other about how certain energy 
projects should evolve. South Stream, prior to its cancellation, proved the existence of a substantive 
division between EU institutions such as the European Commission and some of the countries of Central 
and South-Eastern Europe—specifically Hungary and Bulgaria. The differences of opinion between the 
EU member states of the region and Germany with regard to Nord Stream 2 reflect similar concerns. The 
rhetoric of member states regularly spills out into the forums provided by the EU institutions, and these 
institutions increasingly have their own positions to promote. This raises questions about concepts such as 
energy solidarity in Europe and the commitment of member states to abide by the EU’s market 
regulations in the field of energy. The EU’s Energy Union, which was launched in February 2015, was in 
part established to respond to large-scale controversial and contested pipeline projects as a means of 
strengthening the security of the energy supply of its members. It is intended to enhance the EU’s role in 
negotiating on behalf of its members, and to improve the concept of solidarity and to promote the free 
movement of energy through a completely integrated and liberalized market as a ‘fifth freedom’, 
alongside the right of establishment and freedom to provide services, and the rights to free movement of 
goods, workers and capital. Although this should improve the ability of the EU and its member states to 
engage with Russia and other large suppliers, it is also likely to encounter challenges in doing so if it 
lacks the support of all of its members. For example, both the Czech Republic and Hungary, despite 
officially supporting the Energy Union’s development, have at different times publicly queried various 
strategies promoted by the Energy Union to achieve that solidarity. 
 
 
Although as stated at the beginning of this essay, Central and South-Eastern Europe is considered to be 
the most vulnerable region in Europe for energy insecurity, the reality is that the level of insecurity may 
be overemphasized. Certainly, the region has encountered clear problems and the geopolitical and 
geoeconomic power play surrounding large-scale pipeline projects, including most recently Nord Stream 
2, has not helped to lessen that insecurity. The role of pipeline politics is also unlikely to diminish while 
pipeline projects remain the most beneficial or cost-effective approach for energy suppliers. However, the 
use of alternative technologies, including LNG and renewables, as well as promoting smaller pipeline 
interconnector projects and overall greater regional co-operation, has had a positive impact on the 
region’s ability to address some of its energy security challenges. Differences of opinion and policy 
preferences do remain and national self-interest may still challenge a common EU position, but it is 
unlikely that the region will in the future again face the same level of energy insecurity that it experienced 
during the Russia–Ukraine energy crises of 2006 and 2009.  
 
